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The years 2011 and 2012 brought waves of political unrest in North Africa and 
across the Arab world.  Egypt and Tunisia experienced massive protests that eventually 
toppled long-time presidents.  An ongoing series of violent protests and political 
demonstrations continued until recently in Yemen and Libya, the former leading Yemeni 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh to sign a power-transfer deal in November 2011 and the 
latter evolving into a civil war that defeated and killed the dictator Muammar Gaddafi.  
Syria remains unsettled but also drifted from political anger into open revolt. The 
uprisings in the past two years spawned a new generation of activists who have 
reinvented massive street action as a means of political expression organized and 
advanced through social media. 
This research examines the use of social media as related to these Arab protests 
and civic unrest, testing the widespread belief that the communication revolutions of the 
Internet and social media played a large role in the political revolutions sometimes 
known as the Arab Spring.  The researchers take a two-pronged approach.  Initially, we 
examine the pre-uprising communication firmament in Egypt, specifically seeking 
correlation between heavy Internet use and political dissatisfaction.  This will be done 
using a secondary analysis of the Egypt portion of the 2008 World Values Survey.  
Secondly, we use secondary analysis of the Arab Barometer, first wave 2006-2007, 
seeking further confirmation of the association between heavier Internet use and greater 
political dissatisfaction.   
The goal is not to quantify the roles of Internet and social media use during the 
actual uprisings.  Instead, the objective is to examine the extent that these communication 
tools were known and available to, and frequently used by, those who were politically 
aching for change.  When conditions arose making political revolt possible, the 
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groundwork had been laid for how the Internet and social media became useful, and 
perhaps necessary, tools for organizing the revolt. 
 
 Literature Review 
 
For thirty years Egypt had been under the rule of President Hosni Mubarak. He 
managed to maintain power despite various incidents of popular unrest, such as the 
Kefaya of Kifaya (Arabic for “enough”) movement in 2004-5. That uprising strongly 
campaigned against corruption and Mubarak’s authoritarian policies. To forestall future 
revolts, Mubarak implemented an array of emergency laws leftover from the Arab-Israeli 
war.  These practices, mixed with an intentional weakening of political opposition, 
allowed Mubarak to rule as a quasi-dictator (Bery, 2011).  
Mubarak’s biggest problem, though, was Egypt’s deep domestic problems, 
ranging from corruption to police brutality. Poverty was another major contributor, as 
millions of Egyptians lived on less than $2 a day (Pintak, 2011). These problems 
gradually led the public to revolt and to oust him from the presidency (Faris, 2008). 
 Initially, the Mubarak government, similar to the governments in other Northern 
Africa and Middle Eastern countries, strongly promoted Internet use in Egypt to create a 
strong information-literate society. This popularization led to increased Internet 
communication that openly criticized the regime. Users organized protests online even 
before the recent uprisings, and often avoided any repercussions (Hamdy, 2004). 
Egyptian bloggers straddled between political activists and online journalists as they 
reported stories that were prohibited by mainstream news outlets (Pintak, 2011). Many 
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internet-facilitated organizational efforts exposed cases of police corruption, harassment, 
and anti-democratic policies (Faris, 2008). 
 The Internet was used as a tool of the movement against Mubarak. Protestors 
employed various tactics: social media organizing, encryption strategies for encoded 
messages, sharing online content, and using online maps for tactical purposes (Khamis 
and Vaughn, 2011). Generally, social media platforms were, at least initially, a valuable 
source of communication and coordination, as protesters in various cities gradually joined 
in the revolution.  
 Political discussions also flourished on Facebook. It had four million users in Egypt 
by 2010 (Howard, 2010). The now famous “We are all Khaled Said” page quickly 
became a critical arena for organizing and spreading awareness of protests. The memorial 
page was created after Khaled Said was beaten to death by Egyptian police officers. Post-
mortem photos of Said went viral, sparking worldwide outrage (Khamis and Vaughn, 
2011). Twitter also engaged followers, especially in bridging Egypt to neighboring 
countries. Much of the early news of the protests spread to the outside world through 
Facebook and Twitter before reaching traditional news media (Lotan, Graeff, Annanny, 
Gaffney, Pearle, and Boyd, 2011). Even after mainstream communication outlets 
published a story, many young Arabs were neglecting the stories because they didn’t trust 
the content (Pintak, 2011). 
 The open streams of information and communication raised red flags for Mubarak. 
He resorted to his emergency laws and imposed serious repercussions, especially on 
traditional media outlets; the government even closed TV channels on grounds of public 
order and national security in an attempt to control communication outlets (Pintak, 2011). 
The Egyptian government installed software that enabled the state to monitor heavily 
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Internet traffic with particular interest in social networks, email, and Skype (Ackerman, 
2011). When the police monitoring increased, protesters began avoiding such 
applications for political rallying (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). Eventually, all Internet 
communications were disabled nationwide in order to prevent the protesters' ability to 
organize and gather through social media. Those who cooperated with the media, such as 
cyber-protestor Wael Ghonem, were arrested and detained. During this time, several 
residents reported that cell phone service was down and even landline phone service was 
sporadic (Kazamias, 2011). The Internet disappearance would not, however, inhibit the 
tens of thousands of Egyptians who protested on the streets of major cities - including 
Tahrir Square in Cairo.  
Protesters relied heavily on the Internet and social media as communication 
technologies. The protests, sit-ins and political demonstrations show the combination of 
different social networking platforms were crucial in the manifestation of the rebellions. 
They also were critical in supporting and spreading revolutionary events to surrounding 
nations (Khamis and Vaughan, 2011).  
On February 11, 2011, Mubarak resigned from his presidency and handed power 
to the armed forces of Egypt who dissolved the Parliament, suspended the Constitution of 
Egypt, and promised to dispose the emergency laws (Bly, 2011).  
 Again, most protesters did generally rely on traditional ways of communicating and 
organizing beyond the Internet, especially after the initial protests and when, in this case, 
the Internet was shut down (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). Even protesters who heavily 
relied on the Internet eventually only used technological platforms for private exchanges 
of information with trusted friends, for fear of penetration by the regime (Khamis and 
Vaughn, 2011).  
Social Media as Precursor to Arab Revolt, p. 
 
5 
 The popular press often has cited social networking as a catalyst for many of the 
Arab Spring protests, demonstrations, and riots. However, the actual role of social media 
during the Arab Spring has been hotly debated (Youmas and York, 2012). Some 
researchers claims social media to be only the tool that ignited the uprisings while others 
say it was the main prompt.  Kazamias (2011) argues that citizens only used the networks 
initially to reach out to other potential rebels, but eventually turned to more traditional 
forms of communication. He says information networks like Facebook and Twitter 
sparked the uprisings, however, he suggests that older technologies, even word of mouth, 
were more important tools.  Either way, social media use has demonstrated to the world 
its influence; internet-facilitated information allowed the world to connect with the 
protestors and in some cases assisted in organizing the protests themselves (Schillinger, 
2011). For example, Facebook messages revealed that “group members” were assigned to 
inform at least 10 individuals outside of the group about upcoming demonstrations and 
events (Kazamias, 2011).  
 The Spring 2012 edition of Arab Media & Society had four articles addressing the 
role of the internet in general, and social media in particular, in the uprisings in Egypt and 
Tunisia.  Dajani (2012) warned against overstatement of the influence of such media 
forms, arguing that scholars and critics were repeating the errors of “magic bullet” media 
effects theories tossed around in the 1920s in response to the new media of radio and 
film.  He declared, “Facebook, the Internet and satellite television could call Egyptians to 
the streets, but it could not have sustained a mass movement had it not been for the direct 
contact among people.”   
 Furthermore, Dajani noted, the uprisings should not be jammed into a western 
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media frame of yearning for democracy.  Instead, he argues, protesters were moved by 
frustrated desires for pride, dignity, and opportunity, expressed more in group than in 
individual terms.  He claims the notion that “what is foreign shines” as the rush to adopt 
technology is matched by the unquestioned adoption of some Western values and 
explanations. 
 Hassan (2012) went further, suggesting that the speed of the new technology 
gives rise to venting but rarely allows for the slower rhythms of democracy.  Social 
networks thus give rise to a political vacuum, and something quite different from the 
vague “people power” will fill that void. 
 Egypt is the largest social media market and Saudi Arabia is the third largest, 
noted Samin (2012), writing from the relative tranquility of the latter.  He contends that 
social media serve to accelerate processes already afoot; each society has different 
underlying dynamics more relevant to the success or failure of social movements. 
 The three critiques nicely put forth questions partially answered by a peer-
reviewed research article in the same edition (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughan, 2012).  The 
researchers tracked some of the history and factors at play in both Egypt and Syria.  They 
properly note that Egypt has “a persistent bap between the young online political activists 
on the one hand and the broad offline Egyptian population on the other.”  Facebook 
users, they postulate, can be viewed as small in number, but influential in discourse.  
They must be.  Internet access remains costly and the Egyptian illiteracy rate exceeds 40 
percent, the authors properly recognize. 
 Syria has used techniques of repression and suppression to make difficult and 
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dangerous both online and in-person collaboration for political change, serving as an 
example of Samin’s point about underlying dynamics.  In addition, while Egypt’s online 
community may have had success in motivating large numbers to the cause of Kefaya, it 
lost to on-the-ground organized Islamist parties in 2011 parliamentary elections; in 
March of the same year those same face-to-face forces won on questions of constitutional 
amendments. 
 Khamis, Gold and Vaughan (2012) quote Gallup in pointing out that only eight 
percent of Egyptians got their news from Facebook or Twitter during January and 
February of 2011; only 17% had home internet connections.  Most, 63 percent, got news 
of the protests from Al Jazeera, the satellite delivered TV news operation (see Hellyer, 
2012). 
The overwhelming use of social media in the Egyptian Revolution likely indicates 
the demographics of the people who essentially were powering the Arab Spring. Young 
people fueled the revolts of the various Arab countries by using their abilities to navigate 
social networking to release the word of uprising to surrounding cities and nations all 
over the world. This also may indicate that the protestors shared common dissatisfactions 
within their economic, social and especially political standing in their respective 
countries. This leads to the following hypotheses:  
 H1: There will be a positive relationship in the World Values Survey between 
Egyptian social and political dissatisfaction and Internet use.  
 H2: There will be a positive relationship among Arab Barometer respondents 
between social and political dissatisfaction and Internet use. 
 





The following research compares several variables measuring Egyptian social and 
political satisfaction and Internet use. The data analyzed are from the 2008 World Values 
Survey; wave five of the project and covering the years 2005 to 2008.  This wave was 
done in 54 countries.  The World Values Survey describes itself as “a worldwide network 
of studies measuring changing values and their impact on social and political life” 
(Inglehart, 2012). 
 The Egyptian portion of the 2008 World Values Survey sampled households in the 
extended roster for the post-enumeration survey of the 2006 Census, covering about 1.8 
percent of the total population. All interviews were conducted face-to-face in Arabic. To 
reduce sampling error, the study selected only 25 households using systematic random 
sampling from each of 480 segments (areas in which study was conducted) that was 
proportional to the nation’s size according to the 2006 population census. This study was 
conducted from March 15, 2008 through April 5, 2008. 
 Measurement of Egyptian social and political satisfaction and Internet use was 
recorded based on responses to the following questions from the 2008 World Values 
Survey. 
Internet use: dependent variable 
 V228: “People use different sources to learn what is going on in their country and 
the world. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you used 
(the Internet) last week or did not use it last week to obtain information (read out 
and code one answer).”  
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Possible responses: Used last week, Not used last week 
Additional responses were: Missing, Not asked, Not applicable, No answer, Don’t Know. 
These responses were recoded to equal System Unavailable. 
Social and political satisfaction: independent variables 
 V10: “Taking all things together, would you say you are?” 
Possible responses: Very happy, Quite happy, Not very happy, Not at all happy 
Additional responses were: Missing, Not asked, Not applicable, No answer, Don’t Know. 
These responses were recoded to equal System Unavailable.  
 V22: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these 
days? Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely dissatisfied” and 10 
means you are “completely satisfied” where would you put your satisfaction with 
your life as a whole?” 
Possible responses: 1 Dissatisfied, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Satisfied 
Additional responses were: Missing, Not asked, Not applicable, No answer, Don’t Know. 
These responses were recoded to equal System Unavailable. 
 V138: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell 
me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a 
lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” 
  “The government (in your nation’s capital)” 
Possible responses: A great deal, Quite a lot, Not very much, None at all 
Additional responses were: Missing, Not asked, Not applicable, No answer, Don’t Know. 
These responses were recoded to equal System Unavailable.  
 V162: How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed 
democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 
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means “absolutely important” what position would you choose? 
Possible responses: 1 Not at all important, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Absolutely important 
Additional responses were: Missing, Not asked, Not applicable, No answer, Don’t Know. 
These responses were recoded to equal System Unavailable.  
 Arab Barometer (2012) used face-to-face interviews among citizens over the age of 
18.  It was done in Arabic, and used a cluster stratification plan similar to World Values 
Survey. Arab Barometer was done as follows: Algeria, sample size of 1300, Fall 2006; 
Jordan, sample size of 1143, Spring 2006; Lebanon, sample size of 1195, Fall 2007; 
Morocco, sample size of 1277, Fall 2006; Palestine (West Bank and Gaza), sample size 
of 1270, Spring 2006; Yemen, sample size of 717, Fall 2007. 
 Internet usage was measured with the question (222q) “How often do you use the 
internet.  The answering options: Daily of almost daily, at least once a week, at least once 
a month, several time a year, or I do not use the internet.  The answers were reverse 
coded so one equaled Do Not Use, two was several times a year, 3 was at least once a 
month, 4 was at least once a week, and 5 was daily or almost daily.  This was done to 
create an easily understood scale where higher numbers correlated with greater use.  
 The Arab Barometer scaled question about Internet use then could be used for 
regressions against scaled questions on other matters.  Those simple regressions were run 
against: 13 questions about life satisfaction, interest in politics, and participation in public 
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 In the World Values Survey 17,642 Egyptian respondents (28.2 percent) reported 
using the Internet in the past week while 45,082 (71.8 percent) reported they had not.  
Comparison of responses to the dependent variable (V228) tested with the independent 
variables (V10, V22, V138, and V162) yielded results that generally supported Hypothesis 
One. Contrary to prediction, Egyptians who used the Internet actually reported being 
happier than non-users.  One suspects that might be a consequence of having the wealth 
to acquire such communication resources.  Egyptian Internet users compared to non-
users, as predicted, were more dissatisfied overall with their life.  Furthermore, Internet 
users compared to non-users were more dissatisfied with government.  They also valued 
democracy more than non-users.  All differences were statistically significant at the p 
<.0001 level (Table 1). 
 The simple regressions using the Arab Barometer supported Hypothesis Two.  At 
highly significant levels (p < .0001) as Internet use increased, so did: 
• regarding the current political situation as bad, and describing it as poor, 
• saying you have a substantial interest in politics, 
• spending time overseas, 
• regarding your town as unsafe, and thinking you were safer 3-5 years ago, 
• rejecting the notion that people should support government decisions even if 
one disagrees with those decisions. 
At slightly less overwhelming, but still statistically significant (p < .022) levels, 
greater Internet use also correlated with describing the current economic situation of 
one’s country as poor.  These generally dour financial sentiments, however, were societal 
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not personal.  Heavier Internet use also correlated with rating the economic situation of 
your family as good (Table 2). 
Heavier Internet use also was associated with greater faith in democracy.  Heavy 
users were more likely than others to prefer a democratic system, and reject a strong 
leader with no parliament model.  Heavier users also were more likely than others to see 
Japan and the United States as more of a complete democracy, and more likely to see 
Saudi Arabia, China, and their own country as drifting toward the dictatorship end of the 
spectrum (Table 3). 
Governance issues also showed some trends.  Heavier users of the Internet were 
less likely than others to see government’s role as dealing with deteriorating moral 
values.  Heavy users tended more than others to describe as good a multiparty 
parliamentary system.  Heavy users also were more likely to have little to no confidence 




 Egyptian Internet users shared certain social and political dissatisfaction that 
exceeded the dissatisfaction of non-users in 2008.  Recognizing that more dissatisfied 
Egyptians used the Internet at that time is important as it preceded severe political unrest. 
Internet-facilitated networks allowed Egyptian rebels to connect with one another to 
organize riots and protests.  Growing nationwide anger could have been predicted based 
on the population who was using the Internet and were already socially and politically 
dissatisfied. These rebels took advantage of their access to a platform with opportunities 
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to reach out to other potential rebels in mass quantities to gather information and share 
ideas. It is no surprise that the violent uprisings and eventual ousting of President Hosni 
Mubarak followed the cyber meetings. 
 There were no questions related to social media use in the 2008 World Values 
Survey but it appears reasonable and likely that mere Internet use expanded to include the 
use of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Skype.  The Arab Barometer data also 
enhance and clarify these conclusions.  One must remember the Internet is a fluid and fast 
medium with little care or respect for national boundaries.  Throughout the Middle East 
and North Africa a politically frustrated group, often middle class and young, found 
support, sustenance, and community online.  They shared a common language, Arabic, 
and a common sense that one need not be satisfied with a long-established but corrupt 
and undemocratic order.  The outcomes may differ by nation state, but these secondary 
analyses clearly show that the online communication environment helped prompt revolt, 
even if that revolt later moved to other persons and grew by face-to-face and other 
traditional communication.   
 If their website projections are accurate, both World Values Survey and Arab 
Barometer expect to complete a new wave of surveys in late 2012 that should be 
available presumably by 2013.  The new data should offer even more insights into the 
role of social media during the actual revolt period.  This work, however, shows that the 
communication and political environments were primed and ready when circumstances 
unleashed what became known as the Arab Spring.  
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Table 1. T-tests, World Values Survey in Egypt.  Happiness, Life Satisfaction, 
Government Confidence, and Importance of Democracy versus Internet Use 
 
Question Internet Mean Std. Dev. N t p 
       
Happiness User 1.76 .635 16415 26.7737 <.0001 
 Non-User 1.94 .750 36887   
       
Life Satisfaction User 7.35 1.844 16415 31.4798 <.0001 
 Non-User 6.71 2.296 36887   
       
Govt. Confidence User 2.63 .833 16415 17.5857 <.0001 
 Non-User 2.48 .941 36887   
       
Importance Democracy User 8.98 1.497 16415 18.3152 <.0001 




Table 2.  Regression, Arab Barometer: Internet Use and Satisfaction/Interest/Participation 
 
Question Beta T p 
Current political situation (very good to very bad) .057 4.326 .000 
Current overall economic condition of your country .044 2.295 .022 
State of your country’s economy in 3-5 years -.025 -1.594 .111 
Rate the economic situation of your family today -.178 -11.116 .000 
Impact government policies have on your daily life .025 1.869 .062 
How would you describe present political situation .083 4.665 .000 
Freeness and Fairness of the Last National Election .066 4.183 .000 
How Interested Would You Say You Are in Politics -.139 -7.098 .000 
How Often Follow News about Politics/Govt.  .015 .783 .434 
People should support govt. decisions even if disagree .071 4.472 .000 
Time Spent Overseas in Past Five Years .144 11.253 .000 
City/town safety: unsafe to safe -.051 -3.935 .000 
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Table 3.  Regression, Arab Barometer: Internet Use and Democracy 
 
Question Beta T p 
Iran (1 Complete Dictatorship to 10 Complete Democracy) -.007 -.303 .762 
Turkey (same scale) -.018 -.710 .478 
Saudi Arabia (same scale) -.109 -4.381 .000 
Japan (same scale) .113 4.252 .000 
United States (same scale) .064 2.379 .017 
China (same scale) -.072 -2.722 .007 
Israel (same scale) .029 1.118 .264 
Your Country (same scale) -.067 -2.879 .004 
Democracy: Economy Runs Badly .000 .018 .986 
Democracy: Indecisive and Quibbling -.037 -2.116 .034 
Democracy: Not Good at Maintaining Order .054 3.000 .003 
Democracy: Better than any other form of government -.038 -2.625 .009 
Political Systems: Democratic System -.047 -3.222 .001 
Political Systems: Strong Leader, No Parliament .125 8.268 .000 
Political Systems: Experts rather than government .002 .132 .895 
Political Systems: Mix of Three, One Ruler .043 2.734 .006 
 
 
Table 4.  Arab Barometer: Internet Use and Governance Issues 
 
Question Beta T p 
Good Way Governing: Parliamentary, all parties compete -1.091 -3.417 .001 
Parliamentary, only Islamic parties .704 1.094 .274 
Strong President and Military, parliament not important 1.023 2.241 .025 
Islamic Law, no parties or elections -.693 -1.141 .254 
    
Present Government: Managing Economy -.018 -.868 .385 
Creating Jobs -.026 -1.185 .236 
Narrowing Gap between Rich and Poor .042 1.944 .052 
Addressing Educational Needs -.026 -1.156 .248 
Dealing with Deteriorating Moral Values .080 3.966 .000 
    
Confidence: Prime Minister (1 none to 4 great deal) -.064 -3.527 .000 
Confidence: Courts .000 .010 .992 
Confidence: Parliament -.059 -3.196 .001 
Confidence: Police .011 .666 .506 
Confidence: Political Parties .022 1.361 .173 
 
  
